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STATE OF IDAHO,

)
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)
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)
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)
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)
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)

EVAN DEAN ANDERSON,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

183$
Has Anderson

failed to establish that the district court

abused

its

uniﬁed sentence of 10 years, with one year ﬁxed, upon the jury’s verdict
possession of methamphetamine, with a persistent Violator enhancement?

Anderson Has Failed To Establish That The
Approximately three months
after

after

District

Court Abused

Anderson was released on

Its

by imposing a
ﬁnding him guilty 0f

discretion

Sentencing Discretion

parole,

and just three days

he was released from jail for a parole Violation, ofﬁcers responded t0 a report that Anderson

had entered an Albertsons

store,

“was yelling

at [an

employee], and was foaming

at the

mouth.”

(PSI, pp.101, 104.1)

Upon

contacting Anderson in the Alberstons parking

obviously see that he had foam 0n his

lips

lot,

ofﬁcers “could

and around the edge 0f his mouth,” “could smell an

odor 0f alcohol emitting from his breath,” and noted that his pupils were “highly

dilated.

He

continued to ramble, making random statements, and told [ofﬁcers] he was God.” (PSI, p.101.)

Ofﬁcers “attempted t0 calm [Anderson] down and advised him that paramedics were coming t0

check him out

t0

make

sure he

was okay”; however, Anderson “did not want

that,”

“took off

running,” and entered a Stinker gas station, where he began “yelling at customers and attempting

t0 talk t0

them through

their vehicles.”

(PSI, p.101.)

When

the paramedics arrived,

“became aggressive and confrontational,” but ultimately agreed

by ambulance.”

(PSI, p. 101

.)

At the

up package” of methamphetamine

The

state

“be transported to the hospital

hospital, security personnel discovered a “small,

Anderson’s pocket. (PSI,

wrapped-

p. 101.)

charged Anderson With possession of methamphetamine and a persistent

Violator enhancement.

Anderson

in

to

Anderson

(R., pp.20-21, 38-39.)

guilty of the charge

The case proceeded

and the enhancement.

(R., pp.1

1

1-12.)

t0 trial

The

and a jury found

district court

imposed

a uniﬁed sentence 0f 10 years, With one year ﬁxed, and ordered that the sentence “run
concurrently with

all

other sentences currently being served.” (R., pp.1 17-20.) Anderson ﬁled a

notice of appeal timely from the judgment 0f conviction. (R., pp.121-23.)

Anderson

asserts that the district court erred

0n the consideration of an improper

factor,”

because the sentence

namely a

is

“based

its

decision

desire to “promote simplicity in the

administration 0f [Anderson’s]

supervision While 0n release.”

Anderson has

an abuse of discretion because he has failed t0 challenge the

1

failed to establish

PSI page numbers correspond
“ConDocs_Anderson.pdf.”

With

the

page

numbers

(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6)

of

the

electronic

ﬁle

court’s actual holding

and because the court properly considered the interplay of the probation

and parole system as applied

“An
sentence

is

appellate review of a sentence

not

illegal, the

clear abuse of discretion.”

sentence

criteria, the

1, 8,

was

the defendant

excessive, considering any

show

that

it is

must show

View 0f the

conﬁnement

retribution applicable t0 a given case.”

App. 2018).

The

differing weights

district court

when

unreasonable and, thus, a

392 P.3d 1243, 1246
that in light

is

discretion,

we review

conﬁnement

appears at

necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective 0f

all

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

State V. Reed, 163 Idaho 681,

417 P.3d 1007, 1013

(Ct.

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them

9,

368 P.3d
its

at

629;

discretion

of punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed

“When

the entire

will probably

it

is

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse

the need for rehabilitation).

App.

of the governing

reasonable if

deciding upon the sentence. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

in concluding that the objectives

(Ct.

State V. McIntosh, 160

facts.”

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). “A sentence of conﬁnement

protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

considering Whether the district court abused
sentence, but

we presume

its

sentencing

defendant’s term of

that the

be the ﬁxed portion 0f the sentence, because whether or not the

defendant’s incarceration extends beyond the
discretion of the parole board.”

(2017).

based 0n an abuse of discretion standard. Where a

State V. Bonilla, 161 Idaho 902, 905,

the time of sentencing that

State V.

is

appellant has the burden t0

“To show an abuse 0f discretion,

2017).

Idaho

in this case.

“In deference to the

trial

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

Will

392 P.3d 1228, 1236

State V. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895,

judge, this Court will not substitute

sentence Where reasonable minds might differ.”

its

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

be Within the sole

View 0f a reasonable

at 8,

368 P.3d

(quoting State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).

at

628

Furthermore,

“[a] sentence

ﬁxed within

the limits prescribed

abuse of discretion by the

trial

court.”

by

the statute will ordinarily not be considered an

Li. (quoting State V. Nice,

103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d

323, 324 (1982)).

A
within

trial

its

court’s decision regarding Whether imprisonment 0r probation

State V. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 P.3d 632,

discretion.

LC.

(citations omitted);

§

19-2601(4).

The goal 0f probation

rehabilitation while protecting public safety.

State V.

251, 253 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted).

an abuse of discretion

if

it is

is

for possession

not less than ﬁve years, up to

(R., pp.117-20.)

650 P.2d 707, 709

(Ct.

is

App. 2002)

foster the probationer’s

deny probation

_, 367 P.3d

Will not be

deemed

I_d.

(citing

App. 1982)).

of methamphetamine, With a persistent Violator enhancement,

life in prison.

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of 10
guidelines.

(Ct.

Cheatham, 159 Idaho 856,

A decision t0

appropriate

consistent with the criteria articulated in LC. § 19-2521.

State V. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567,

The penalty

is to

635

is

years, With

The

LC. §§ 19-25 14, 37-2732(c)(1). The

one year ﬁxed, Which

district court’s

falls

district court

well within the statutory

sentence on a repeat offender

within

its

rej ecting

the

is

discretion.

On

appeal,

Anderson contends

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

by

defense recommendation 0f probation, With local incarceration (and programming) as a condition

0f probation, “based
p.6.) This

its

decision on the consideration of an improper factor.” (Appellant’s brief,

argument does not Withstand

First,

analysis.

Anderson’s argument ignores the

district court’s

speciﬁc ﬁnding that “defendant

not amenable t0 probation and he’s a danger to himself and society.”

Anderson does not challenge

this

(TL, p. 270, Ls. 10-1

is

1.)

holding 0n appeal, and therefore cannot show error by

challenging only one of the district court’s bases for

its

decision.

E

State V.

Goodwin, 131

Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where appellant does not challenge “an
independent, alternative basis” for the holding, the holding Will be afﬁrmed 0n the unchallenged

basis).

Second, Anderson does not present any legal basis for his argument that a

may not

consider

When

district court

deciding Whether to place a defendant on probation the effects of serving

a simultaneous sentence or parole. Because he has presented n0 legal authority for his argument
that the court

may not consider the possibility of parole

t0 order probation in the current case,

V.

he has failed

in a separate case

when

deciding whether

t0 present a cognizable claim

Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)

(“When

issues

0f error.

m

0n appeal are not

supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered”).
Indeed, Anderson’s argument

is

factual,

and not a legal argument.

He

argues that

simultaneous parolez and probation would “probably provide more protection for society” and
that the district court’s concerns about conﬂicts in the administration

probation were “unfounded.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)
his

own

internet search, that

legal support

and

is

Finally, the

was not before

He

the district court.

relies

(Id.)

of simultaneous parole and

0n evidence,

in the form,

0f

Anderson’s argument lacks

therefore not properly before the Court.

one legal authority arguably cited in support of the argument,

(cited Appellant’s brief, at p.

4 (With a “see”

sets forth criteria for placing a

cite)),

I.C. §

19-2521

does not support his argument. That section

defendant on probation or imposing imprisonment, such as risk of

2

It should be noted that because parole Violation proceedings based on this conviction were
pending, Anderson’s recommendation was based 0n the “hope” that the parole board “Will

follow suit” and grant Anderson parole 0n his prior felony sentence. (TL, p. 263, L. 23 — p. 264,
L. 5.) There was a not insigniﬁcant chance that any probation ordered in this case would have

been served simultaneously With incarceration in the
conviction.

state penitentiary for the

previous felony

crime, need for correctional treatment, depreciation of the seriousness of the crime, etc. I.C. §
19-2521.

Notably absent is any prohibition to considering whether the current crime also

violated a prior parole.
Nor does the general claim (Appellant’s brief, p. 4) that the possibility of a simultaneous
parole in the prior sentence is not relevant to whether probation is appropriate in the current case
hold water. Probation is administered by the district court. I.C. §§ 19-2601 - 19-2603.) Parole
is administered by the Commission on Pardons and Parole. I.C. § 20-210A. Although both
probation and parole have a common goal of rehabilitation, there is no requirement that they
attempt to achieve that goal in identical fashion.

The possibility of cumulative or even

conflicting instructions to the defendant on simultaneous parole and probation is a valid concern.
The district court properly concluded that it did not want Anderson “dealing with parole and
parole officers and parole terms while at the same time dealing with probation, probation officers
and probation terms” because it was “easier” if there was only parole, and parole on two matters
would assure that rehabilitation was “all done the same way” whereas simultaneous parole and
probation would not. (Tr., p. 270, L. 21 – p. 271, L. 5.)
Anderson has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion when it
considered the possibility of parole in the prior sentence when it imposed a unified sentence of
10 years, with one year fixed, and declined to place him on probation.

6

m
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm Anderson’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

correct copy of the attached
iCourt File and Serve:

that

I

have

this

23rd day 0f September, 2019, served a true and
to the attorney listed below by means 0f

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
d0cuments@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

